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Abstract 
Online platforms are prone to abuse and manipulation from strategic parties. For 
example, social media and review websites suffer from the presence of opinion spam 
and fake reviews. Applying the economic concept of rational expectation equilibrium 
(REE), we explore the impact of manipulation on consumer welfare in a Twitter-like 
environment. We argue that the REE outcome can be decomposed into a firm-centric 
effect and a rational expectation effect, and the relative strength of these effects 
determines the final level of manipulation. We also examine the effect of competition on 
firms’ manipulation levels. We find that the combination of a competition effect and a 
rational expectation effect determines the overall effect of competition on strategic 
manipulation. This research sheds light on the reliability of opinion mining, and 
contributes to our understanding of strategic manipulation in the context of sentiment 
analysis. 
Keywords:  Business value of IS, Economics of information systems, Sentiment analysis 
 
Introduction 
“You may fool all the people some of the time; you can even fool some of the people all the time; 
but you cannot fool all of the people all the time.” 
--- Abraham Lincoln (Attributed) 
Much economic activity involves the understanding of consumers’ preferences and the subsequent 
recommendations of products of interest, both of which are instrumental to product-selling firms’ 
performances. Thanks to their popularity and ability to reach diverse demographic groups, internet 
platforms have established themselves as powerhouses where consumers seeking information can interact 
among themselves as well as with sellers, and sellers can actively identify target consumers and channel 
their advertisements accordingly. These online platforms include e-commerce website such as Amazon; 
social media sites such as Facebook, Twitter, and Foursquare; and recommendation and review websites 
such as Yelp, TripAdvisor, and Expedia. What these platforms have in common is the ability for 
consumers to voice their opinions, and for sellers to inform potential consumers of the quality of their 
products or services in various ways. These platforms also establish a better communication channel 
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between sellers and buyers. Both consumers and sellers can benefit from active participation on these 
platforms because they provide consumers with much more detailed information on products, while 
providing firms the opportunity to reach out to target consumers. 
Producers on social media sites rely heavily on the word of mouth effect from a consumer’s social 
connections to boost sales. Recommendations on these sites often come in the following two forms: you 
can either receive recommendations directly from your friends’ endorsements, or you can be 
recommended products that are popular among your social connections. To facilitate a better 
recommendation, social media sites maintain a huge repository of social graphs, activities, and opinions, 
utilize machine learning techniques to predict users’ preferences, and conduct sentiment analyses to 
discover sentiments at both the individual and aggregate levels. Specialized data analytic firms also 
provide sentiment analysis services to consumers and producers based on social media data. 
However, popular platforms are prone to abuse and manipulation from strategic parties, and these 
manipulations can cause dire consequences. For example, to increase product visibility, producers might 
want to manipulate platform data by adding positive sentiments themselves, so the sentiment analysis 
results would be more favorable to their products; platforms, trying to increase visitor traffic and 
encourage more user participation, do not necessarily want to eradicate such producer-generated data 
pollution. 
To better understand the effect of manipulation, we choose to base our analysis on Twitter, a popular 
microblogging service worldwide, and examine to what degree such strategic behaviors would impact 
consumer welfare. We emphasize that our goal in this paper it to provide a general framework to analyze 
the effect of strategic manipulation on consumer welfare. The model we construct in this paper is 
applicable to a variety of social networking and opinion forums, with Twitter being a motivating example 
of such a platform that might suffer from the manipulation issue. Therefore, we do not explicitly model 
some microblogging-specific functionality such as "retweet" or "following" in our current setup. We defer 
the discussion of manipulation specific to microblogging platforms to future studies. 
The use of Twitter in marketing and advertising arenas has been remarkably dynamic, so are the 
speculations of the underlying business values associated with individual Twitter accounts and the huge 
trove of tweets. Ever since it went public, Twitter’s stock price and market valuation have been extremely 
volatile, mostly because investors do not yet have a clear picture of how much the presence of Twitter has 
exactly altered the business landscape, nor has Twitter found a concrete path from tweets to profits. Even 
the metrics that have been used to estimate Twitter’s success remain rather unsophisticated, including 
counting the number of monthly active users (MAUs), and calculating the growth rate of its user base. 
This choice of metrics implies that Twitter would encourage users to be actively engaged in conversations 
and to invite friends to join them, both of which could explain why it would actively or passively allow for 
some level of manipulation. 
A severer issue related to Twitter’s advertising and sentiment aggregation efficacy is the prevalence of 
spam tweets and robotic programs. They have both been flying under the radar but quickly undermining 
legitimate advertisers’ efforts to connect with target consumers, and data analysts’ tasks to aggregate 
public sentiments (Coy 2013). While the popularity of Twitter attracts advertisers to pay to increase their 
Twitter presence, malicious individuals or even competitors can write simple programs to achieve the 
same level of advertising without Twitter’s spam filter and verification mechanisms detecting them. A 
New York Times article (Urbina 2013) lists some common goals these bots are designed to achieve: voice 
synthetic opinions to influence elections and stock market, or even to flirt with people—none of these 
matters to Twitter’s business sustainability nearly as much as how these bots, which strategic firms 
deploy, can also be manipulated to produce massive numbers of spam tweets to sabotage legitimate 
advertising campaigns and contaminate sentiments. Figure 1 shows a screenshot of a website that sells 
Twitter accounts. 
Generally speaking, manipulation is a result of lack of awareness, absense of verification mechanisms,  
platforms’ incentive, or the nature of the chosen business model. Twitter does not have a proper 
verification mechanism to filter out opinion spam, i.e., fictitious and often fradulent reviews that are 
written specifically to deceive readers (Ott et al. 2011; Ott et al. 2012; Mukherjee et al. 2013); it is 
especially susceptible to sentiment contamination where advertisers deliberately manipulate public 
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opinions by flooding the twittersphere with positive tweets and by exploiting spamming techniques to 
create positive word of mouth. 
 
 
Figure  1: Buy Accounts 
  
 
We explore the relationship between the level of sentiment manipulation and consumers’ actions under 
rational expectation equilibrium in the current study. Our findings suggest that, when advertisers are low 
quality producers, the level of manipulation will be higher than the case when advertisers are high quality 
producers. We also examine how the level of manipulation would be different if consumers were aware of 
the presense of fraudulent information, and we find that the negative effect of manipulation is the largest 
when consumers are naive and not aware of any manipulation. Our results reflect the combination of two 
effects that determine the equilibrium outcome: a firm-centric effect and a rational expectation effect. 
The firm-centric effect drives the firm to pursue a high level of manipulation, since more fake information 
would make consumers more likely to believe that a given product is of high quality; in contrast, the 
rational expectation effect dissuades the firm from manipulating too much, since the more manipulation, 
the more consumers will discount any information they receive. The relative strength of the two effects 
determines the total effect. We also examine the effect of competition on firm manipulation. Similarly, the 
equilibrium outcome can be decomposed into a competition effect and a rational expectation effect. The 
competition effect induces firms to manipulate more in the presence of rivals, while the rational 
expectation effect discourages manipulation. 
Although researchers in computer science have made efforts to detect and filter out malicious behaviors, 
advertisers and platforms’ economic incentives are more difficult to change. In addition to modeling 
consumers’ response to the presence of spam, we also discuss how verification strategies and better 
control of message content can potentially curb the manipulation issue. We point out that firms’ strategic 
spamming behaviors will stifle Twitter’s attempt to profit from providing advertising opportunities for 
potential businesses. This implies that Twitter’s business model, which hinges on both advertising and 
sentiment aggregation, is handicapped by its lack of verification and content monitoring. Our research 
contributes to the literature on sentiment aggregation by formulating a rational expectation equilibrium 
framework to model the firm’s incentive to manipulate, and by analyzing the resulting effects on 
sentiment analysis and consumer welfare. Our analyses also suggest that practitioners should be cautious 
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when conducting sentiment anlaysis on user generated content, as the designs of these platforms make 
them susceptible to strategic manipulation. 
Literature Review 
User generated content (UGC) and social media data have been used in all aspects of decision making 
processes. In the computer science literature, O’connor et al. (2010) connect public sentiment measured 
from Twitter data with public opinion surveys from polling organizations, and they find that these two 
data sources correlate with each other; Bollen et al. (2011) show that certain dimensions of  public mood, 
reflected in tweets, can be used to predict stock market performance. The information systems 
community has also embraced the power of social media. Rui and Whinston (2011) implement a Business 
Intelligence (BI) system based on tweets to forecast movie box office revenues. Their results demonstrate 
that the forecasts of opening weekend box office revenue can be improved by incorporating Twitter data. 
In another paper, Rui et al. (2013) examine the Twitter word of mouth (WOM) and its implications on 
product sales.1 
Despite the effectiveness of UGC and social media data in improving business decisions, several studies 
have empirically shown the existence of widespread manipulation practices on these sites. Mayzlin et al. 
(2013) examine the prevalence of difficult-to-detect fake reviews on popular review websites. More 
specifically, they use a difference in differences approach to look at how hotel characteristics and 
ownership structure affect the level of review manipulation, which consists of posting positive reviews for 
one’s own business and manufacturing negative reviews for competitors, on travel websites Expedia.com 
and TripAdvisor.com. Luca and Zervas (2013) investigate the presence of restaurant review fraud on 
another review webiste, Yelp.com. They find that positive review fraud is related to reputational concerns, 
while negative review fraud is more likely due to competitions. Anderson and Simester (2014) offer a 
different perspective on the nature of deceptive reviews. Using a dataset from a private apparel retailer, 
they find that, in addition to firms’ strategic behaviors, customers without clear financial incentives to 
manipulate product ratings might still write reviews on products they did not purchase. 
Besides review websites, social media platforms also suffer from manipulative behaviors. Stringhini et al. 
(2012) detail the existence of Twitter Account Markets that aim at inflating one’s number of followers as 
well as sending out advertising tweets at a large scale. Messias et al. (2013) construct fake accounts on 
Twitter to demonstrate how these accounts’ influence measures can be significantly improved by 
following simple automated strategies. The results of these studies imply that the credibility of UGC and 
social media data can be questionable. Therefore, decisions made based on questionable data can be 
harmful to the decision maker’s welfare. Manipulation on these platforms also has behavioral 
implications. Adomavicius et al. (2013) examine the effect of recommendation on consumers’ preference 
formation by manipulating the predictions made by recommender systems, and they find the existence of 
a strong anchoring effect. In other words, consumers’ constructed preferences can be effectively 
influenced by suggestions made by recommender systems. Their findings suggest that strategic 
recommender systems can intentionally provide recommendations that would result in systematic biases. 
Muchnik et al. (2013) conduct a randomized field experiment and show that the collective intelligence 
among a group is often affected by social influence bias where an individual’s behavior is influenced by 
the aggregate. 
Dellarocas (2006) constructs a theoretical model on firms’ manipulative behaviors. He shows that 
manipulations could be beneficial to consumers if firms’ manipulation strategies are monotonically 
increasing in their true qualities. He also shows that, under certain threshold conditions, firms would 
actually benefit if manipulation were not possible. Mayzlin (2006) examines marketers’ incentives to 
generate anonymous promotional messages online. Using a game theoretic model, her results show that, 
contrary to traditional advertising strategies, firms producing low quality products would engage in more 
promotional chat than those producing high quality products. This is because high quality product 
benefits from positive WOM which substitutes for advertising, while low quality product does not. Our 
                                                             
1 Netzer et al. (2012) use network analysis and text-mining techniques to uncover market structure by analyzing UGC in both the 
online sedan cars and diabetes drugs forums. Hill and Benton (2014) make the connection between TV shows and UGC on Twitter, 
and, in aggregate, they demonstrate how one can estimate the demographics of different shows’ viewers by analyzing their tweets. 
These estimated demographics can then be used to improve TV show and brand recommendations. 
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paper is distinct from these two prior studies in the following ways: (1) we formally define rational 
expectation equilibria in the context of sentiment analysis, and explicitly compare the differences induced 
by having rational-expectation-forming consumers and naive consumers; (2) Mayzlin (2006) assumes 
that some portions of the consumers are “informed” in the sense that they know exactly the quality of the 
product. In our setting, we do not require that the consumers know the product quality; instead, the 
informed consumers in our setup only have to know that a proportion of messages are posted strategically 
by the firm itself. 
Distinct from previous studies, we adopt the rational expectation equilibrium framework, popularized by 
the influential works of Sargent and Wallace (1975) and Lucas (1976), to examine firms’ incentive to 
generate opinion spam in a Twitter-like social broadcasting environment. The use of a rational 
expectation equilibrium in modeling both firms and consumers’ equilibrium behaviors can also be found 
in Su and Zhang (2009). 
Model 
We choose to base our analysis on a Twitter-like environment, and therefore we use the word “Twitter” to 
refer to opinion platforms, and “tweets” to refer to the content on these platforms. We emphasize that our 
analysis is not limited to Twitter; instead, the theoretical results can be applied to any opinion platform or 
review website that features user generated content. 
Baseline Model (No Manipulation) 
Formally speaking, we assume there are n  consumers who are interested in N  products, with unknown 
qualities, Nqq ,,1 K , sold by N  different firms. Without loss of generality, we focus our discussion on the 
case where 1=N , and delay our discussion on multiple firms to a later section. These consumers arrive 
sequentially, and the quality of any given product can be either good, G , or bad, B , i.e. }.,{ BGq∈  
Consumers receive a private signal, ,s  independently and identically drawn from a Bernoulli distribution, 
,p  and this signal can be either high, H , or low, L , with the high (low) signal meaning the product is 
more (less) likely to be of good quality. We assume a common prior on the probability that the product is 
of good quality: 2./1=)(Pr=)(Pr BG  This means that, without seeing any signals, the product is 
equally likely to be of good or bad quality. We further assume that signals are informative with the 
following values: 4,/3=)|(Pr=)|(Pr BLGH  and 4./1=)|(Pr=)|(Pr BHGL  Applying the law of 
total probability, we can derive the prior probability of receiving an H  or an L  signal: 
,2/1)(Pr)|(Pr)(Pr)|(Pr=)(Pr =+ BBHGGHH  and, similarly, 2./1=)(Pr L  Before making the 
purchasing decision, the consumer would log on to Twitter to tweet her signal, and then search for tweets 
regarding this specific product. Based on her own signal and other people’s tweets, she uses Bayesian 
update to calculate the posterior probability of the product quality. Suppose she receives a H  signal. 
Applying the Bayes rule, the posterior probability of the product being of good quality is 
4./3=)|(Pr HG  More generally, we assume that she sees a total of n  H  signals and m  L  signals, 
inclusive of her own signal, and also assume that signals are independent draws. The consumer makes her 
decision based on the average sentiment conveyed by these tweets, together with her own signal. 
Normalizing the utility of purchasing a product of good quality, ),(GU  to be 1, and 1=)( −BU  for bad 
quality product, the consumer’s expected utility of purchasing this product can be expressed as 
),()(1)(=]|[E BUqGUqsignalsU ⋅−+⋅ where we define )|(Pr= signalsGq  to be the posterior 
probability of the product having good quality, after inspecting the tweets and her own signal. The 
following proposition characterizes the condition under which the consumer will purchase the product.  
Proposition 1 (Consumer’s Decision Rule) Let n  and m  be the number of H  and L  tweets, 
respectively, that a consumer observes on Twitter in the case where there is no firm manipulation. Then 
the consumer will purchase the product if .< nm  (Proof available upon request.) 
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The intuition behind this proposition is that, since there is no firm manipulation and all tweets are 
genuine, if the number of high signals is larger than that of low signals, it is more likely that the product is 
of good quality. Therefore, the consumer will purchase the product if nm < . The firm, in contrast, shares 
common priors with consumers. To figure out the demand and thus the revenue level, the firm would 
estimate the number of consumers that will purchase its product by inspecting the prior on both the 
signal distribution and the number of consumers who are to make purchasing decisions. Similar to the 
earlier discussion on the consumer’s purchasing decision, we can model the sequence of tweets, and thus 
the signals, each of the consumers sees when she searches for this product on Twitter, as a sequence of 
H ’s and L ’s. Since the order of signals in a sequence does not affect the consumer’s decision (with the 
exception of her own signal which works as a tie-breaker), we can instead model these signals as a 
combinations of H ’s and L ’s. This combination of signals can be represented as follows. For the i -th 
consumer, let 11 ,, −iss K be the signals she sees. Also, let H  take the numerical value of 1 and let L  be 
1− . Then the i -th consumer’s purchasing decision, denoted as iD , can be modeled as the process of first 
summing up the numerical values of H ’s and L ’s in the combination of signals she sees, i.e. ,
1
1= k
i
k
s∑ −  
and then inspecting her own signal, ,is  to check if the sum is greater than the threshold value, 0 . Then, 
assuming a more general case where the firm has a prior belief p  on how likely a consumer would receive 
an H  signal, is  follows a Bernoulli distribution: .)(Bernoulli psi ~ In the following discussion we 
suppress the functional dependence on the prior belief p  for notational ease. Notice that her decision, 
,iD  can be expressed as 
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From the firm’s perspective, the expected value of consumer i ’s decision, ],|[E pDi  can be understood 
as the expected number of consumers that will purchase this product. This expectation can be derived 
from the following equation: 
 ]|[E pDi 1})=({Pr= iD { } .1=0=Pr0>Pr=
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Finally, assuming there are n  consumers to make purchase decisions, we can calculate the firm’s 
expected profit by summing over all consumers’ expected values of decisions, with the firm having a prior 
belief p  and the price of the product normalized to 1: [ ],|E=][E=Profit Expected
1=
pDi
n
i
∑π where 
each ]|[E pDi  is obtained via equation (2), and where we treat the product’s production cost as a sunk 
cost, and therefore exclude it from the profit equation. 
Manipulation Model 
Naïve Consumers 
Knowing consumers’ decision rules, the firm would have a strong incentive to post positive tweets online, 
masqueraded as any normal consumer’s signal-reporting tweet, in order to attract more consumers. This 
form of opinion spam could be used for advertising, political propaganda, and many other purposes. 
Consumers might make suboptimal choices if such manipulation behaviors, and the subsequent 
sentiment pollution, remain unknown to them. In this section, we explore the effect of manipulative 
tweets on Twitter by quantifying the optimal level of manipulation in which the firm would engage, 
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together with the corresponding profit level, assuming consumers are unaware of the presence of opinion 
spam and thus believing in the tweets completely. 
Similar to the setup in the previous section, we assume there are n  consumers interested in a firm’s 
product, and the firm has access to common priors, and can form a probabilistic belief, ,p  on the 
probability that any given consumer would receive an H  signal, )(Pr H . We assume that the number of 
interested consumers, n , is known to the firm ex ante, and that the firm has already produced the 
products, so the production costs are sunk and not included in the firm’s profit maximization problem. 
Therefore, the only decision the firm has to make is to decide the number of fake positive tweets to post. 
We choose to call these tweets “fake” because in our setup tweets are assumed to convey the real signals 
consumers received, whereas these tweets posted by the firm are purposely produced to manipulate 
consumers’ purchasing decisions. 
To simplify the problem, we assume the firms can only post fake tweets at the beginning of each 
advertising campaign. Once it posted fake tweets it would leave the platform and collect revenue from 
consumers’ purchases. In order to determine the number of fake positive tweets to be posted, the firm 
firstly inspects the consumer’s decision rule and the expected demand level. Following the decision rule 
given in equation (1), the firm knows that a consumer will purchase the product as long as the number of 
positive tweets is greater than that of negative tweets. Therefore, a plausible strategy is to make sure that, 
for every consumer, positive tweets outnumber negative tweets by at least one. In other words, by posting 
1+n  fake positive tweets, the firm can ensure that consumers will all purchase, because even in the worst 
case scenario where everyone receives an L  signal, the total number of positive tweets, 1+n , still 
exceeds that of negative tweets, n . This obviously depends on the firm’s cost of posting fake tweets. Here 
we assume that the cost of manipulating can be expressed as a general cost function, ,)( bma  where m  is 
the number of fake positive tweets that the firm chooses to generate, and both a  and b  are some known 
constants. Then, extending the baseline model, the firm’s optimal manipulation level can be derived by 
maximizing its profit function: 
 .)(],|[Emaxarg=
1=
* b
i
n
im
mampDm −∑  (3) 
Rational Expectation Model with Rational Consumers 
A more interesting case is when some consumers realize that the firm is manipulating its Twitter 
sentiment, and therefore discount the proportion of positive sentiments to correct for the potential 
upward bias caused by these manipulative positive tweets. We extend our baseline model to accommodate 
for both (A) the firm’s manipulative behaviors, and (B) consumers’ rationally discounting of any positive 
tweets. More specifically, using the concept of rational expectation equilibrium, at the equilibrium, the 
firm will decide on a level of manipulation, i.e. the number of fake positive tweets, to post on Twitter, and 
consumers will rationally expect this level of manipulation and discount the positive tweets they see on 
Twitter. 
Formally speaking, let m  be the number of fake positive tweets that the firm decides to post on Twitter. 
We again assume that the firm posts all of its tweets before any consumer tweets, and consumers arrive 
sequentially. Then for the i -th consumer, the combination of tweets she would see on Twitter includes 
both previous consumers’ tweets, ,11 −iss K  her own tweet, is , together with the firm’s m  fake positive 
messages. The consumer’s decision rule is the same as the baseline model where she would compare the 
number of positive tweets with that of the negative tweets. The difference here is that we assume the 
consumer is aware of the possibility that certain tweets might have been manipulated, but she is not able 
to distinguish genuine positive tweets from fake positive tweets, presumably because the firm uses 
different aliases to post. Therefore, a rational consumer would discount the number of positive tweets by 
some discount factor, f , which corresponds to her belief of the level of genuine tweets among all positive 
tweets. Since we only consider rational expectation equilibria, this discount factor f  must also equal the 
proportion of genuine positive tweets among all positive tweets posted on Twitter. Based on its belief of 
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the probability of any consumer receiving an H  signal, the firm’s problem is to choose the number of fake 
positive tweets to post. Let the firm’s belief of any consumer receiving an H  signal be some probability 
p , and let the total number of consumers be n . Then the expected number of genuine positive tweets is 
pn ⋅ . Depending on the value of m , the expected proportion of genuine positive tweets and, 
equivalently, the consumer’s discount factor, f , can be expressed as )./()(= mpnpnf +⋅⋅  For 
simplicity, we assume the consumer only discounts positive tweets she sees, while she trusts her private 
information and thus never discounts her own signal. Also, let ih  denote the quantity 1)=(1= j
i
j
sI∑ , 
where )(⋅I  is the indicator function. Notice that in this case, aside from her private signal, the i -th 
consumer sees ( )1−+ ihm  positive tweets and cannot distinguish the firm’s fake positive tweets from 
genuine positive tweets. At a rational equilibrium, she rationally and correctly expects the proportion of 
genuine tweets, and discounts positive tweets by f .  So the “effective” level of positive tweets is now 
 ( ) ( ),=1 11 −− +⋅+⋅
⋅
⋅+⋅ ii hm
mpn
pn
hmf  (4) 
where we have first converted the H  signals to 1, then discounted them each from 1 to f ; 10 ≤≤ f ; 
1−ih  follows a binomial distribution. The consumer’s decision rule is now 
 
( ) [ ]
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+−⋅−−++⋅
−−
−−
otherwise.0
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i sshihmf
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D  (5) 
Denoting the quantity ( ) [ ][ ]1)(1)( 11 −⋅−−++⋅ −− ii hihmf  as *iS and following the derivation in the 
baseline model, we have 
 ]|[E pDi 1})=({Pr= iD { }( ) { } { }( ).1=0=Pr0>Pr= ** iiiii ssSsS ∧+++  (6) 
Let π  denote the firm’s profit level. Then the firm’s profit maximization problem is  
 ,)(][Emax=))(,(max
1=
b
i
n
im
m
mapDpmp −∑π  (7) 
and the optimal level of manipulation, 
*m , is given by .)(][Eargmax=
1=
* b
i
n
im
mapDm −∑  
To summarize, we provide a formal definition of a rational expectation equilibrium involving one strategic 
firm and n  rational consumers.  
Definition 1 A rational expectation equilibrium with one strategic firm and n  rational consumers 
consists of ( ),}{, *,1,= mDf nii K  which satisfies 
 { } { }( ),1=0=0)>(=)( ** iiiiii ssSsSDi ∧+++ II  
 ,)(][Eargmax=))(,(argmax=)(
1=
* b
i
n
imm
mapDpmpmii −∑π  (8) 
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 ,=)(
*mpn
pn
fiii
+⋅
⋅
 where 
*
iS  is defined as ( ) [ ][ ]1)(1)( 11 −⋅−−++⋅ −− ii hihmf . 
Notice that condition (i) is from the rational consumer’s optimal decision iD  based on her belief of the 
proportion of genuine tweets, f ; condition (ii) is from the strategic firm’s optimal choice of its 
manipulation level; condition (iii) is the consistency condition. 
Results 
In this section we describe our simulation results and compare how the rational expectation equilibrium 
model provides different estimates from the model of naive consumers. For the first set of simulations, we 
set the number of consumers to be 30 ; the cost function, ,)( bma  is specified with 0.1=a  and 2=b  , 
i.e. a convex (quadratic) cost function. The intuition behind using the above functional form to specify the 
manipulation cost is as follows. We use this cost function to model the cost of posting fake messages, as 
well as reflecting how strict the verification mechanism is on the given platform. The more strict the 
verification mechanism is, the more costly it should be for firms to manipulate successfully. Therefore, we 
believe that a convex cost function would be suitable for our simulations. Several past studies, including 
Mayzlin (2006), also use a convex function to model the cost of manipulation. We note that our 
simulation results are robust to different values of a  and the number of consumers. This cost function 
specification implies that the marginal cost of producing a fake tweet increases in the manipulation level, 
potentially because it would become increasingly difficult to avoid detection once the number of fake 
tweets is large, and thus more costly for the firm to manipulate. We vary the probability that the signal 
associated with this product is high from 0.3  to 0.7 . Notice that this probability is positively associated 
with the product quality, with good quality product having a higher probability of its signals being high. 
The manipulation results based on different probability levels allow us to understand how product quality 
affects the firm’s incentive to manipulate. Figure 2(A) shows different levels of manipulation as we vary 
the probability of the product being of good quality from 0.3  to 0.7.  We can see that, in general, the 
higher the probability of the product being of good quality, the less manipulation the firm would generate. 
This result is consistent with the findings from Mayzlin (2006) where she shows that firms that produce 
low quality products spend more on promotional chats. It is worth noting that there is a significant 
difference between the naive and the rational cases where the firm would try to manipulate more when 
users are naive. 
To calculate consumer welfare, we assume the utility of buying a good product to be 1, that of a bad 
product to be 1− , and the utility of not buying any product to be 0 . We also assume that consumers are 
risk neutral. Figure 2(B) plots the levels of consumer welfare for both the naive and rational cases, against 
varying levels of product quality. This figure shows that the difference in welfare level between naive and 
rational consumers is the largest when product quality is low. In other words, naive consumers suffer the 
most when facing low quality products, while there is no significant difference between naive and rational 
consumers when product quality is sufficiently high. On the other hand, firms in general would benefit 
more when consumers are naive, and the difference is most pronounced when product quality is low, as 
shown in Figure 2(C). This means that, as long as consumers are naive, firms do not necessarily need to 
increase the quality of their products; instead, they could potentially rely on posting fake positive tweets 
in order to attract consumers. 
We also simulate the case where the cost function is linear instead of convex. The results are similar to the 
convex cost case, except for the manipulation level when consumers are rational. We can see from Figure 
2(D) that, given the probability of good product, the firm seems to be manipulating much more in the 
linear cost case compared with that in the convex cost case. In other words, when the marginal cost of 
manipulation is increasing, the firm manipulates more in the naive case; with a constant marginal cost of 
manipulation, the firm manipulates more in the rational case. This might be because that, since the cost of 
manipulating is relatively small, the firm would try to manipulate more when facing rational consumers in 
order to compensate for the discounting of positive tweets that those consumers would engage in, so the 
resulting positive sentiment could still be favorable for the firm. Note that the type of marginal cost faced 
by manipulative firms can be determined by the verification and detection mechanisms the platform 
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employs. For example, platforms without strict verification policies such as Twitter and TripAdvisor might 
fall in the category of constant marginal cost, which means that, in the rational consumer setting, firms 
would engage in more manipulative behaviors on these platforms. In contrast, other platforms have 
mechanisms that can better ensure the integrity of user generated content: Yelp has a review filter that 
hides suspicious reviews (Luca and Zervas 2013); only the customers who have reserved and visited 
restaurants are allowed to submit ratings on the restaurant reservation platform OpenTable. This type of 
platforms uses verification mechanisms to deter abuse and manipulation, which can be modeled as having 
an increasing marginal cost, and results shown in Figure 2(A), Figure 2(B), and Figure 2(C) would apply. 
It is worth noting that, without taking into account the consumer’s forming rational expectation with 
regard to firms’ manipulaton, we would have underestimated the level of manipulation, had the cost 
function been linear. 
To provide some intuitions for these results, we consider two forces that affect the equilibrium outcomes. 
Firstly, there is a firm-centric effect which encourages the firm to manipulate more when the consumers 
are rational. This is because rational consumers expect some level of manipulation, so the firm would have 
to exert extra efforts in order to counter the consumer’s discounting; when consumers are naive, the firm 
can more easily convince them to purchase its product, and hence they would not have to manipulate as 
much. However, there is another effect, which we coined the rational expectation effect, that induces 
consumers to engage in more sentiment discounting the more likely the firm wants to manipulate, and 
thus the less effective the manipulation would be. Therefore, when the cost of manipulation is high, the 
rational expectation effect will predict a decrease in manipulation. Overall speaking, a rational 
expectation equilibrium reflects both effects, and the results depend on the relative strengths of them. In 
the convex cost case, since manipulation is relatively costly, the rational expectation effect outweighs the 
firm-centric effect, so we observe a lower level of manipulation in the presence of rational consumers 
compared with the naive setting, as illustrated in Figure 2(A). By similar reasoning, since the cost of 
manipulation is relatively cheap in the linear cost case, the firm-centric effect dominates, and we observe 
a higher level of manipulation in the rational setting than that in the naive setting, as shown in Figure 
2(D). It is worth noting that, while informative, our rational expectation equilibrium results are 
theoretical in nature. The analysis conducted here regarding rational consumers and naive consumers are 
likely to differ from the real world situation, because in reality some consumers are likely to be rational 
while others might be unaware of the existence of any strategic manipulation. Our contribution is to 
provide bounds for the real situation, which lies somewhere in between the completely rational and the 
completely naive cases. 
Multiple Firms with Rational Consumers 
We can extend our discussion of rational expectation equilibrium to the case where there are multiple 
strategic firms and n  rational consumers. We discuss the two-firm case in this paper, since adding more 
firms would be a straightforward generalization of the two-firm results. Before formally defining the 
rational expectation equilibrium, we first set up consumers and firms’ decision problems as follows. 
First we suppose that all players in this model possess common priors on the probability of product A  
receiving an H  signal, denoted as Ap ; and, similarly, the probability of product B  receiving an H  
signal, Bp . Without loss of generality, we assume .> BA pp  Firm A  and firm B  sell similar products 
and the consumer can only purchase at most one firm’s product. We further assume that both firms know 
there are a total of n  consumers in the market. Similar to the one-firm case, since consumers rely on 
Twitter sentiment for decision making, firms have incentives to strategically post fake positive tweets in 
order to attract consumers to purchase their products. In a rational expectation equilibrium, the 
consumer does not know the actual level of manipulations firm A  and firm B  would pursue. Instead, she 
possesses some beliefs over the proportion of positively manipulative tweets among all tweets related to 
both firms, denoted as 
Af  and ,Bf  respectively. We assume that all consumers share the same Af  and 
Bf . Firm A  decides the number of fake tweets it will post, ,Am  given its beliefs of firm B ’s 
manipulation level, 
BR . Similarly, firm B  posts Bm  fake positive tweets to promote its own product, 
based on its belief of firm A ’s manipulation level, .AR  To simplify the model, we assume that firms only 
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post fake positive tweets about their own products, and do not post fake negative tweets about their 
competitor’s product. 
A rational expectation equilibrium in this context means that all consumers choose a purchase 
strategy, ,}{ ,1,= niiD K  to maximize their expected utilities, while firms maximize their expected profit, 
Aπ  
and ,Bπ  given the consumer’s purchasing strategy and competitors’ manipulation level. For the i -th 
consumer, we assume that she observes a total of 
Ak  tweets on product A , i.e. AAk
A σσ K,1 , and 
Bk  
tweets on product B , i.e. ,,1
B
Bk
B σσ K  both excluding her own signals, Ais  and 
B
is . Since she cannot 
distinguish genuine tweets from fake tweets, we use )(iAφ  to express product A ’s discounted average 
sentiment that she can observe, where )(iAφ  is defined as 
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ProductB ’s discounted average sentiment observed by consumer i , )(iBφ , can be defined similarly. Firm 
A ’s objective is to maximize its expected profit by choosing a manipulation level, ,Am  given its belief of 
firm B ’s manipulation strategy, BR . Its maximization problem is formulated as 
 );,,,(argmax=)( ABBA
A
Am
BA mRppRm π  (10) 
firm B ’s maximization problem is formulated similarly. Based on the single firm case equilibrium 
definition in equation (8), we have the following rational expectation equilibrium definition:  
Definition 2 A rational expectation equilibrium for two strategic firms and n  rational consumers 
consists of ),,,,}{,,( ,1,=
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nii
BA RRffDmm
K
 which satisfies 
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where Ap  and Bp  are the common priors for firms’ products, respectively; )(),(( ii
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Figure 2 (A) Manipulation, convex cost; (B) Welfare, convex cost; (C) Profit, convex cost; 
(D) Manipulation, linear cost. Solid line: Rational consumer, Dashed line: Naïve consumer 
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Notice that in Definition 2, condition (i) specifies consumers’ decision rules; condition (ii) and (iii) ensure 
that the level of manipulation that firm A  and firm B  attempt is equal to their respective profit-
maximizing levels; condition (iv) ensures the rational expectation equilibrium in the sense that the 
resulting manipulation level of each firm is equivalent to its competitor’s expectation and the consumer’s 
expectation of its manipulation level. Equation (12) details the consumer’s decision rule where this rule 
makes use of the following principles: (1) the consumer would always choose the product with a higher 
discounted tweet sentiment, as long as that sentiment is positive. If both products’ sentiment levels are 
negative, then the consumer will not purchase either one; (2) the consumer’s own private signal is 
assumed to be always genuine, and serves as a tie breaker when the number of discounted positive tweets 
equals the number of negative tweets; (3) if a tie persists after applying the previous two principles, then 
we assume that the consumer will take a Bernoulli(1/2) random draw to decide which product to 
purchase. 
Results 
Figure 3(A) and 3(B) plot the simulation results from a rational expectation equilibrium with two 
competing firms. Each plot represents three sets of firm types, indexed by “High”, “Medium”, and “Low”. 
The “High” case is specified with the two firms both having high probabilities of producing good quality 
products, with the two probabilities being 0.7=)=(Pr Hsignal  and 0.6 , respectively. Intuitively, we 
can understand these probabilities as different firm types, with the higher probability firm producing a 
better quality product, and the lower probability firm producing a lower quality product. Figure 3(D) lists 
all combinations of firm types that are used in our simulation. The results in Figure 3(A) correspond to 
the profit, sales, and manipulation levels of Firm A when it competes with Firm B, with the associated 
firm product qualities listed in Figure 3(D). Note that the focal firm in Figure 3(A) is Firm A, namely the 
firm producing the higher quality product among the two competing firms; Figure 3(B) illustrates the 
effect of competition on Firm B, the firm producing the inferior product among the two competing firms. 
We also point out that the effect of competition is measured by comparing the level of manipulation, 
consumer welfare, firm sales, and firm profits, in the two-firm case, with those in the monopoly setting, 
holding the focal firm’s product quality constant. For example, the “High” case in Figure 3(A) represents 
the effect of competition on a firm with product quality 0.7 when facing a competitor that produces a 
product of a lower quality, 0.6. As mentioned earlier, we simulate both the case where this high quality 
firm faces no competition, and the case where it faces competition from a lower quality firm, and compare 
these two cases to estimate the effect of competition. Similarly, the “High” case in Figure 3(B) illustrates 
the effect of competition on a firm which produces a product with a quality level of 0.6, when competing 
with a firm that produces a better product with a quality level of 0.7.   
To see how the cost structure of manipulation changes the effect of competition, we also simulate the 
rational expectatoin equilibrium across three quality levels where the cost to manipulate is linear in 
manipulation, shown in Figure 3(C). Comparing Figure 3(A) and Figure 3(C), we can see that the changes 
in the manipulation level facing competition are much larger in the linear cost case than those in the 
convex cost case. This is because it costs less for the firm to manipulate when the cost is linear than when 
it is convex. It is worth noting that the changes in profit and sales levels are also larger in the linear cost 
case than those in the convex cost case, most likely because the feasible range of manipulation in the 
linear cost is much larger than that in the convex cost. 
Comparing the effects of competition on both Firm A and Firm B across these three test groups informs us 
of how firms of different quality levels are affected by competition in a manipulative environment. 
Regardless of the firm being better or worse than its competitor, competitions drive down the profit and 
sales levels across all three groups, as can be seen by comparing Figure 3(A) and Figure 3(B). In 
particular, the worse firm in a pair of competing firms suffers more from the competition, both in terms of 
profits and sales. Interestingly, when facing competition, a high quality firm tends to increase its level of 
manipulation much more in the case when its quality is already better than its competitor, than the case 
when its quality is worse than its competitor, as can be seen by comparing the “High” case in both figures. 
On the other hand, a low quality firm tends to decrease its level of manipulation much more in the case 
when its quality is better than its competitor, than the case when its quality is worse than its competitor, 
as can be seen by comparing the “Low” case in Figure 3(A) and 3(B). It is also worth noting that the firms 
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in both the “Medium” and “Low” groups suffer less from the competition, most likely because their profit 
and sales levels are lower to start with, even without any competition. 
 
 
Figure 3: (A): Effect of Competition on Firm A, convex cost; (B) Effect of Competition on 
Firm B, convex cost; (C) Effect of Competition on Firm A, linear cost; (D) List of Cases 
 
This decrease of manipulation level for the low quality firm is surprising because, intuitively speaking, 
firms would want to promote their own products more when a competitor enters the market. For 
 Manipulation in Opinion Platforms 
  
 Thirty Fifth International Conference on Information Systems, Auckland 2014 15 
example, Mayzlin et al. (2013) show that fake reviews are more prevalent for hotels that face a strong 
competition. The intuition behind our surprising results is as follows. Similar to the one-firm case, we can 
decompose the overall effect of competition into the following two effects: the competition effect and the 
rational expectation effect. The competition effect induces the firm to engage in more manipulation in 
order to attract consumers to purchase its product instead of the competitor’s product. On the other hand, 
the firm also cares about the rational expectation effect in the sense that the more manipulation, the more 
discounting the consumers will apply. The resulting equilibrium outcome can be seen as a combination of 
these two effects. If the competition effect outweighs the rational expectation effect, then the firm will 
manipulate more, and vice versa. This explains the decrease of manipulation for low quality firms: if the 
firm’s product quality is already low, then it would probably be detrimental to induce more discounting 
from consumers, and hence the firm would want to engage in less manipulation when its product quality 
is low. 
We also explore the effects of competition on consumer welfare in each of the groups by comparing the 
welfare levels in the two-firm environment with those in the one-firm environment. The welfare changes 
in the presence of competition are also shown in Figure 3(A) and Figure 3(B). From these figures we can 
see that, when a firm is joined by a competitor with a higher quality, the consumer welfare level drops, 
regardless of the quality of these firms. On the other hand, when a firm is joined by a competitor with a 
lower quality, the consumer welfare level increases significantly when the quality of these firms are not 
too low. It might seem contradictory to the intuitive speculation that competition should lead to an 
increase in consumer welfare. This is because we assume that firms do not engage in a price-setting 
competition; instead, they only rely on manipulating sentiments on Twitter to compete with each other. 
Therefore, consumers will not benefit from any price reduction that would have happened in other 
competitive situations. This assumption makes sense in settings where the price variations among 
different producers are small, such as the movie industry, and with this assumption we are able to focus 
our discussion on the effect of manipulation alone. Similar to the results in the single-firm case, the 
multiple-firm rational expectation equilibrium serves as a starting point for us to understand the 
consequence of firm manipulation when the consumers are aware of such strategic behaviors, while in 
reality there will be some consumers that are more rational than others. We will examine the case where 
the consumers are of different types in future research. 
Conclusion 
In this paper we studied the effect of manipulation on consumer welfare, and the effect of competition on 
the firm’s manipulation decision, both in the rational expectation equilibrium framework. We emphasized 
the importance of recognizing the existence of strategic manipulation, because researchers as well as 
practitioniers have been collecting and analyzing tremendous amount of social and opinion platform data 
to conduct sentiment analysis, often without explicitly adjusting for fake sentiments. Our results 
suggested that the equilibrium outcomes of manipulation level can be decomposed into a firm-centric 
effect and a rational expectation effect. When marginal cost to manipulate is increasing, the rational 
expectation effect dominates the firm-centric effect, and the firm will consequently manipulate less. We 
also considered the effect of competition on the firm’s incentive to manipulate. We found that, when the 
firm’s product quality is low, it is likely that the rational expectation effect will dominate the competition 
effect, which would discourage the firm from manipulating.  
We recognize several limitations in the current research: (1) we only considered fake positive messages in 
our theoretical model. However, in reality, firms often post negative messages about competitors to lower 
their competitors’ sentiment; (2) Our current results were obtained from numerical simulations. We plan 
to derive analytical results in our future research, and to decompose the total effect into the firm-centric 
and rational expectation effects analytically; (3) We were unable to empirically estimate the relative 
proportions of rational and naive consumers on the platforms. As a future extension, we plan to 
incorporate the possibility of posting negative messages, and to conduct an empirical study on 
manipulative behaviors on opinion platforms. Moving forward, Twitter, as well as other review platforms, 
must address the spamming and verification issues in order to avoid the danger of losing values and 
relevance in the years to come. Other online platforms should also reassess their susceptability to 
manipulative behaviors, and find ways to maintain their credibility for a sustainble development. 
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